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UTILITIES COMMISSIONS AS EXPERT COURTS
FRANK

W.

HANFT*

SPECIALIZED COURTS

The swarming increase of administrative tribunals within the last
generation caused much excitement and not a little dismay, principally
among lawyers. However, these tribunals which were new, or at least
unprecedented in numbers, already are growing familiar, and therefore
they look less dangerous. They are still denounced, but not many
people expect them to disappear. They are a fait accompli of modern
conditions.
There are two features of these bodies which are of importance to
this discussion. First is the fact that many of them have authority to,
and do, decide disputes which would otherwise be decided by courts.
In the rise of these tribunals which have taken over much of the work
of deciding cases Dean Pound sees a repetition of a process already
familiar in the history of the law, namely, the injection into the legal
order of a larger measure of discretion in the making of decisions; a
return for the time being in some fields to justice without law, or with
a minimum of law.' He compares the growth of administrative bodies
with the rise of equity.2 Doubtless Pound, with his ability to see in the
large the panorama of developing legal institutions, has caught one of
the larger aspects of this new phenomenon. There is, however, another
characteristic of these administrative bodies which distinguishes their
advent from past large scale developments in the jural order; which
marks them as the peculiar product of our own day, and links them with
our modern civilization. Their work is highly specialized. The Interstate Commerce Commission regulates certain public utilities; the
Securities and Exchange Commission handles problems concerning
securities; state industrial commissions have jurisdiction over workmen's compensation. 3 Specialization is one of the most impressive features of our present day civilization. As far back as knowledge of human
accomplishment goes, there has never been a civilization even remotely
approaching ours in the magnitude of its material achievements. The
rapid progress we have made on innumerable fronts, ranging from the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'Pound, Justice According to Law (1914) 14 COL. L. RPv. 1, 18. See also
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREACY OF LAW (1927) 36.
2Pound, op. cit. supra note 1 at 19.
'For an enumeration of the federal administrative tribunals see Report of the
Special Committee on Administrative Law (1934) 59 A. B. A. Rep. 539, 556. The
titles of the tribunals suggest, to some extent, their specialized jurisdiction.
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control of disease to the building of ocean liners, has been made possible
by specialization. Its mark is on our era. Is it strange, then, that the
administration of justice should become specialized? Rather, it would
have been strange if the decision of controversies arising in large and
highly specialized fields of human activity had been left forever to decision by tribunals of general jurisdiction. The world has become
specialized; administration of the law is merely feeling the effect of the
times.
What place the present day administrative tribunals will take in the
legal system of the future is a matter of prophecy. There is a strong
possibility that they will develop into specialized courts. Already there
is evidence that some of these bodies are in the process of becoming
courts. From the beginning many of them have had, among other functions, the duty of deciding cases between, opposing parties; that is to
say, they have done the work of courts. Many of them are manned by
lawyers; specialists, perhaps, but still lawyers; and lawyers represent
the litigants before them. By reason of this fact they are likely to pattern their conduct after that of courts. The same tendency is promoted
by the fact that court litigation affords them a familiar system after
which to model their own.4 Some of the older administrative tribunals,
such as those having jurisdiction over public utilities, are building a
body of precedents, and they follow them. By this process the wide
discretion which is supposed to distinguish administrative from judicial
decisions 5 tends to become reduced to rule, just as the originally wide
discretion of tribunals administering equity tended to become reduced
to rule. Such bodies as utilities commissions render written opinions.
Save for such words as "this commission" here and there in the opinions,
it would in many instances be hard to tell from the text whether a court
or a commission were deciding the cases. 6 Further, these commissions
as part of their usual daily business decide disputed questions of law,
just as courts do. 7
'In North Carolina by statute in cases before the Utilities Commission the rules
of evidence shall be the same as in civil actions, unless otherwise provided. N. C.
CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1093.

Here the legislature used the court model.

Report, Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932) 83-85, treats bodies analogous to
our utilities commissions as specialized courts.
See note 1.
"For example see Certified Highway Carriers Inc. v. Kemp, 8 P. U. R. (n.s.)
52 (Cal. R. R. Comm. 1935).
"In Carriers' Protective Committee v. Leonard, 8 P. U. R. (n.s.) 51 (Pa. Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1935) the sole question before the commission was whether a motor
vehicle carrier operating as a common carrier in interstate commerce, but carrying
in intrastate commerce for only four shippers and for those by special contract
was conducting business as a common carrier in intrastate commerce, so as to
make the operation without a certificate from the state commission illegal. The
commission held the operation illegal, citing a Pennsylvania court decision. In
Certified Highway Carriers Inc. v. Kemp, supra note 6, the commission decided
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There is, then, reason to believe that we may be witnessing the beginning of one of those great changes in the legal system which have
been landmarks in its development from primitive origins. The gripping
story of the growth of law from the rude creeds and customs of barbaric
peoples to a highly perfected instrument of civilization, rich in history
and philosophy, may be in process of having added another chapter.
Perhaps that chapter will be entitled by the jurists of the future, "The
Development of Specialized Courts."
There are, it is true, many differences between courts and administrative commissions. Utilities commissions, for example, may initiate
as well as try cases; may gather as well as pass upon evidence. They
have powers of continuous control over the utilities which occasionally
appear as litigants before them, and they are thereby enabled to understand the litigation by reason of long familiarity with the problems out
of which it grew. These dissimilarities between the old courts and the
new commissions must not be mistaken for evidence that the commissions never can become courts. When tribunals for the administration
of equity first appeared they were vastly different from the common law
courts. Nevertheless these tribunals developed into courts, and brought
with them into the court system powers which enriched the system and
enabled it to keep up with the needs of advancing civilization. Similarly
the administrative commissions of our own time may become courts,
and may bring into the court system the specialization, expert knowledge,
and expanded powers necessary to enable that system to meet the needs
of the civilization of the future.8
that a common carrier of packages by motorcycle side car was included in the
Auto Truck Transportation Act of California as a carrier by "auto truck," and
that therefore a certificate from the commission was necessary. The commission
determined this matter of interpretation of a statute by reasoning as to intent of
the legislature, and searching related statutes, just as a court would have done. In
Re Everett Water Co., 8 P. U. R. (n.s.) 335 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935) the
commission denied approval of a loan from a holding company to an operating
company on the ground that the loan called for interest in excess of the legal rate.
Additional examples of cases wherein commissions decided "questions of law"
are City of Fort Collins v. Pub. Serv. Co., 8 P. U. R. (n.s.) 361 (Colo. P. Us.
Comm. 1935) (a utility can be obliged to sell current to a city for redistribution) ;
Re Pointe Aux Barques Land Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 365 (Mich. P. Us. Comm,
1935) (statutory jurisdiction of commission); Town of Irvington v. Commonwealth Water Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 329 (N. J. Bd. of P. U. Commrs. 1935)
(application of statute).
'It is the possibility of immense gain for the future from the evolution of
specialized administrative commissions which leads the writer to regard as particularly unhappy the recommendation of the Special Committee on Administrative Law (1934) 59 A. B. A. Rep. 539 that the federal administrative tribunals be
replaced by an administrative court shorn of the legislative and executive functions
of the present tribunals. Thereby we would return so far as possible to the model
of the existing courts. The English Committee on Ministers' Powers advised
against the adoption of a regularized system of administrative courts. See Phillips,
An American View of Administrative Law (1936) 52 L. Q. Rzv. 25.
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USE BY UTILITIES COMMISSIONS Or THEIR OWN KNOWLEDGE

Specialization, then, lends both present importance and future promise to administrative commissions as a creation of the modern legal system. One of the principal advantages flowing from specialization is
that it produces expert tribunals. It does so in two ways. If a commission handles nothing except public utilities, then persons expert in
public utility affairs may properly be placed on the commission; and
men on the commission tend to become expert in public utility affairs.
If the benefit of having specialized commissions is to be reaped to the
full, then the fullest advantage must be taken of the expert character of
these commissions; and if the future development of these specialized
tribunals is not to be hampered, we must not generate obstructing legal
difficulties in the way of the use of the expert knowledge and skill of the
tribunals. The concern of this article will be to inquire into the use of
this expert knowledge at present possible under the law; and, in the
light of the above discussion of the place in the legal system which these
tribunals may come to fill, to suggest the course which the law should
take with reference to the use of such expert knowledge. A closely
related problem, which will be considered in conjunction with the one
just stated, is that of the use by commissions of data obtained by them
in the course of their duties. In order to bring the materials within the
bounds of an article, the discussion will center almost exclusively on
utilities commissions.
The right of commissions to resort in deciding cases to their own
knowledge and experience, and to data accumulated by them in the
course of their duties, was early asserted and vigorously defended.
The Interstate Commerce Commission in 1909 boldly declared: "When
considering a complaint involving the rates or practices of a carrier,
the Commission, being an administrative body performing its functions
in the interest of the general public rather than in the interest of particular litigants, is entitled to bring to its aid all the information that
can be drawn either from the records in other complaints before it or
from its general experience and knowledge of transportation matters.
The right which courts have to take judicial notice of certain classes of
facts is extended in the case of the Commission to the entire range of
its experience with transportation problems and embraces all the knowledge that it has gathered from any source." 9
An equally positive statement of the right of a commission to resort
to its own expert knowledge in fixing rates was made by the Minnesota
supreme court in 1897.10 The court in supporting its position pointed
'Joynes v. Pa. R. R., 17 I. C. C. 361, 366 (1909).
Steenerson v. Gt. No. Ry., 69 Minn. 353, 72 N. W. 713 (1897). See also Chic.
& N. W. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216 (1914), approved (1914)
27 HAmv. L. Rav. 683.
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not only to the expert nature of the commission, but to the fact that
it exercised legislative functions. The court said, "It (the commission)
is not a judicial tribunal, but an administrative body, whose powers are
somewhat legislative in character; and, like other administrative or le'gislative bodies, it acquires a knowledge of the facts, circumstances, and
conditions in its own way."' 1
Additional cases supporting the right of commissions to take into
account their own knowledge or specific data accumulated by them will
be treated hereinafter in connection with judicial notice.
The use by the newly developing specialized commissions of their
own expert knowledge was predestined to collide with a doctrine built
up by the older courts of general jurisdiction 'having no expert knowledge; a doctrine perfectly applicable to such courts, and so familiar to
them as to appear to be an inevitable requirement of any real trial at all;
namely, that decisions must be made in accord with evidence duly introduced. The United States Supreme Court announced that the findings
of the Interstate Commerce Commission upon evidence will be ascribed
"the strength due to the judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and
informed by experience."'' 2 However, the commission must decide in
accord with the evidence,' 8 and may not reach a decision unsupported
by evidence. 14 In other words, the experience of the commission will
give weight to its view of the evidence, but that experience must not be
resorted to in lieu of evidence. Neither may the Commission rely on
data accumulated by it but not introduced in evidence.'r "Facts conceivably known to the Commission but not put in evidence will not support an order."' 8 Many courts took a similar view with regard to state
"72 N W. at 716.
See Ill. Cent. R. R. v. I.C. C, 206 U. S. 441, 454, 27 Sup. Ct. 700, 704, 51 L.
ed. 1128, 1133 (1907) ; I. C. C. v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct.
108, 111, 56 L.ed. 308, 311 (1912).
I. C. C. v. L. & N. R R., 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. ed. 431 (1913).
See The New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 203, 43 Sup. Ct. 270, 278,

67 L. ed. 605, 615 (1923) ; I. C. C. v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 547, 32 Sup.
Ct. 108, 111, 56 L. ed. 308, 311 (1912). In Fla. E. C. Ry. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 167,
34 Sup. Ct. 867, 58 L. ed. 1267 (1914) the court held that an injunction should
issue against an order of the commission reducing rates on citrus fruit and vegeta-

bles. The court said that the order of the commission was without evidence to
support it; but an analysis of the opinion shows that the court reversed the commission because the court did not believe the evidence was strong enough to sup-port the order. For example, there was testimony that there had been a considerable increase in volume of the traffic affected by the lower rates. This the
court called "a vague intimation."

See also West v. Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co.,

295 U. S. 662, 676, 55 Sup. Ct. 894, 900, 79 L. ed. 1640, 1650 (1935) approving the
doctrine that an order of a commission made upon evidence which clearly does not
support iti is an arbitrary act against which courts will afford relief.

ZU. S. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 44 Sup. Ct. 565, 68 L. ed. 1016
(1924).
"The Chic. Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 263, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 319, 68 L. ed.
667, 673 (1924). This was an action to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission authorizing the New York Central to obtain control of certain
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7
utilities commissions. They must decide in accord with the evidence.'
They may not reach a decision without evidence to support it.18 Neither
may they resort to data accumulated by them but not put in evidence, 19
20
nor to any other matter not in the record.
The reasons set forward for requiring commissions, like courts, to
confine themselves to the evidence in deciding cases, are many. We have
seen that in supporting the right of commissions to resort to their own
expert knowledge the legislative character of the commissions was
pointed to. In confining the commissions to the evidence before them
the judicial or quasi judicial character of the commissions may be mentioned. 21 Here the stronger position would seem to be the first one; for
granting that the commissions are designed to be judicial bodies, they
are designed to be something more than the kind of judicial bodies the
regular courts are; therefore they may be expected to exercise more
than ordinary judicial powers.

terminal railroads. It was alleged that the finding by the commission that the
acquisition of control would be in the public interest was without evidence to support it. The lower court dismissed the bill on motion of the defendants. The
Supreme Court said that therefore the allegation above must be taken as true, and
reversed the lower court.
"'Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. P. Us. Comm., 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287
(1932) ; cf. West v. Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 55 Sup. Ct 894, 79
L. ed. 1640 (1935).
" West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. Us. Comm., 294 U. S. 63, 55 Sup. Ct. 316, 79 L. ed.
761 (1935) ; Wheat, Practice and Procedure before the Railroad Commission of
California (1927) 15 CAxis. L. Rxv. 445, 466; see L. & N. R. R. v. Finn, 235
U. S. 601, 606, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 149, 59 L. ed. 379, 383 (1915) (The Kentucky
statute, said the court, contemplates that the state commission base its findings on
the evidence, and it could be assumed that the order fixing certain freight rates
would be invalid unless supported by evidence. The court found the order to be
so supported.)
'" Ill. Cent. R. R. v. R R. Comm. of Ky., 1 F. (2d) 805 (E. D. Ky. 1923) ; West
Ohio Gas Co. v. P. Us. Comm. of Ohio, 42 F. (2d) 899 (N. D. Ohio, 1928);
(1931) 29 MicH L. Rxv. 765. But cf. Ga. C. Tel. Co. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm.,
8 F. Supp. 434 (N. D. Ga. 1934). The Johnson Act, 48 STAT. 775 (1934), 28 U. S.
C. Ann. §41 (1), excepts from its prohibition against Federal court injunctions
against utility rate orders of state commissions orders not made after "reasonable
notice and hearing." The question arose whether there had been a "reasonable
hearing" when the state commission had considered evidence in its files not a part
of the record in the proceeding. The court said the hearing is not reasonable
where the affected parties are not allowed to know what evidence is being considered against them. But the court said that since the evidence here considered
was annual reports of the utility itself, and its answers to a questionnaire, which
documents were referred to at the hearing although not introduced, and since the
facts therein are not claimed to be erroneous, the hearing was not rendered unreasonable.
People v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 192 App. Div. 837, 183 N. Y. Supp. 283 (1920);
Appalachian Power Co. v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 1, 110 S. E. 360 (1922) (Due
-process is denied where the commission bases its decision fixing an electric rate
on an engineer's report submitted after the hearing and without an opportunity for
the utility to question it. This was especially true where the engineer recommended a flat rate, whereas the hearing had centered about a primary and secondary
power rate.)
' See Stone, dissenting in West v. Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co., 295 U. S. 662, 688,
55 Sup. Ct. 894, 905, 79 L. ed. 1640, 1656 (1935).
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Some courts have deduced an obligation on the commissions to look
exclusively to the evidence from a statutory provision for a hearing;22
the theory being that since the hearing is obviously for the purpose of
presenting evidence, it is implied that the commission will decide the
matter on the evidence. This looks like bad logic. The hearing is intended to enable interested parties to present their evidence, but it does
not necessarily follow that this evidence shall be the sole source of the
commission's action.
The substantial reasons for confining commissions to evidence before them are that evidence duly presented can be attacked by the other
side, and shown to be untrue, unreliable, incomplete, inapplicable, not
controlling, or offset by other evidence; but if the commission draws
from its own experience or data it has accumulated in its files, without
putting its opinion or data in evidence, there is no opportunity for attack.23 It is not any lack of trustworthiness of the experience or
data which excludes their use, but rather lack of notice to the adverse
parties of the evidence against them.2 4 There is weight in this reasoning. Not only does injustice to a litigant result where he is not presented with the case against him, but the success of the legal system is
impaired by failure to reach the truth which the litigant might make
known if he were aware of all that was being considered against him.
True, once evidence is in making possible a certain decision, the
commission may reach the decision, not because it is persuaded by the
evidence, but because its own experience or data persuade it that the
decision should be made. Nevertheless the necessity of justifying results by evidence sufficient to sustain them produced under the fire of
the utility is some guaranty against decisions founded on inadequate
experience or data.
Commissions are required to look to the evidence before them for
the further reason that if judicial review of commission decisions is to
be had on the record, it is necessary that the record contain all the facts
considered by the commission. 25 Moreover, if a commission were to
be allowed to resort to its own experience, or other matter outside the
record, then the commission's decision on the facts could never be called
into question on appeal, however arbitrary the commission might have
The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 68 L. ed. 667
(1924); People v. Pub. Serv. Comm., supra note 20; see I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R.,
227 U. S. 88, 91, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 186, 57 L. ed. 431, 433 (1912).
'A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., 335 Ill. 624, 167 N. E. 831, 837

(1929); West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. Us. Comm. of Ohio, supra note 19; Atl. Coast

L. R. R. v. I. C. C., 194 Fed. 449 (Commerce Ct. 1911) ; (1931) 29 MIcH L. REV.

765; see I. C. C. v. L. & N. R R., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 187, 57 L. ed.
431, 434 (1912).
U. S. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 289, 44 Sup. Ct. 565, 570, 68 L. ed.
1016, 1023 (1924).
',Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 355.
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been, for the commission could always take the position that its experience and other information not before the court on appeal justified
the decision.2 6 Indeed; the Interstate Commerce Commission did take
exactly that position. The answer of the commission in a case involving the validity of an order of the commission concerning a reshipping
privilege stated, "that in forming its opinion . . . this respondent, exercising its administrative functions and powers, considered all pertinent
facts and matters set forth in many reports and statistics on file with
said respondent, together with other facts coming to the knowledge of
this respondent in the performance of its duties . . . it is therefore not
competent, nor is it relevant, for said petitioners to allege that any particular fact or facts before this respondent in said proceeding were uncontradicted or conclusive in favor of petitioners' contention; nor can
the petitioners by judicial proceedings ascertain each and all the facts,
circumstances, and conditions in regard to said transportation that were
necessarily and properly considered by and which aided this respondent
in arriving at its conclusion ...
"This respondent denies that there is, or can be, under the law, any
27
complete record of all the evidence . . . before the Commission," etc.
The court indicated serious doubt as to whether the method of the
commission was in accordance with due process, but did not find it
necessary to decide the point.
The Minnesota court, however, took a view similar to that for which
28
the Interstate Commerce Commission had contended.
Of course, confining the commissions to the evidence before them
does not necessarily exclude use by them of their experience and accumulated data. Rather, that experience and data must be put in
evidence. How serious an obstacle this may prove to successful use of
such experience and data we shall see presently.
NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF COMMISSIONS

There is, then, a rule which prohibits commissions from drawing on
their own knowledge as experts in lieu of looking to the evidence. But
See I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 187, 57 L. ed.
431, 434 (1912). In West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. Us. Comm., 294 U. S. 63, 69, 55
Sup. Ct. 316, 319, 79 L. ed. 761, 768 (1935) the court said that to make review
adequate "the record must exhibit in some way the facts relied upon by the court
to repel unimpeached evidence submitted for the company. If that were not so, a
complainant would be helpless, for the inference would always be possible that
the court and the commission had drawn upon undisclosed sources of information
unavailable to others. A -hearing is not judicial, at least in any adequate sense,
unless the evidence can be known."

U. S. v. L. & N. R. R., 235 U. S. 314, 321 n., 35 Sup. Ct. 113, 115 n., 59 L. ed.
245, 251 n. (1914).
' Steenerson v. Gt. No. Ry., supra note 10. However, the Minnesota position
precludes reliance by the commission on non-existent data by prescribing that

the court take judicial notice of such knowledge as the commission should possess.
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there is also a wide field wherein the use by the commissions of their
own knowledge is not only permitted but expected. A survey of this
field will be made in order to find the border between the area of the
proper use of the commission's knowledge, and the area covered by the
rule confining them to the evidence introduced.
In general it may be said that there are many duties performed by
utilities commissions without a trial or hearing requiring the formal
presentation of evidence.2 9 Controversies over rates and service which
could be settled in cases tried before the commissions are instead settled
by negotiation with the utilities.3 0 In the course of such negotiation
there is full opportunity for the commissions to make use of their own
experience and information. Sometimes recommendations, founded on
the commission's experience, are made to the utility.3 1 Negotiation and
recommendation may approach the border of adverse decision which
could be made only on evidence. The Maryland commission, after stating that there should be a time limit on the special charges provided by
contract for rural extensions of electric lines, directed that the utility
furnish a plan for financing such extensions, with payments limited as
to the time they were to run. The commission added that if this were
not done within a reasonable time, or if the plan submitted by the utility
were unsatisfactory, the commission would consider preparing a plan
itself, and requiring that extensions be made under that plan and no
other.n 3 2 If as a result of such a direction by a commission a company
were to submit a plan acceptable to the commission, the result would
be the fruit of negotiation subsequent to the order above; but if the
company were to fail to submit a plan, and the commission were to impose one of its own, a hearing might be required and the question might
arise whether the commission, under some of the authority already
referred to, would be limited in its results to those warranted by the
evidence.
Some of the functions of utilities commissions are legislative in na'See Chic. & N. W. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., vupra note 10, 145 N. W. at 218.
'In North Carolina since 1930 far more rate reductions have been accomplished
'by negotiation than as a result of litigation. See In the Matter of the Rates of

the Carolina Power & Lt Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1933-34, 20; In the Matter
of the Rates of the Duke Power Co., N. C. Corp. Comm. Rep. 1933-34, 33. Adjustments through negotiation are part of the usual routine of utilities commissions.
'Re Nekoosa Edwards L. &P. Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 50, 54 (Wis. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1935). Here the commission disapproved of a rate of 2 cents per k. w.h. for
energy purchased by the utility for resale, and recommended that a demand and
energy type of rate be worked out and adopted by the utility. The commission
required that suitable equipment be installed to measure the kilowatt demands of
the utility so that this information would be available for use in determining a
proper wholesale rate.
'Re Conowingo Power Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 353 (Md. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1935).
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ture, and in the performance of duties of this kind, the commissions
resort to legislative methods. For example the Wisconsin commission,
after a hearing at which a very large number of utility companies were
represented, laid down rules for requiring deposits or guaranties from
gas and electricity customers, and rules for making disconnections. The
commission stated that a conference committee of the Wisconsin Utilities
Association met with the commission or its staff on several occasions to
33
discuss phases of the proposed rules.
Commissions likewise resort to their own experience and information in deciding whether to make investigations, 4 and in the conduct
of the investigations. Also in the course of their duties many decisions
of a supervisory or semi-legislative character are made by the exercise
of the judgment of the commissions as informed by experience, rather
than made as the product of evidence. To illustrate: a New Jersey
statute required that all books and records of a utility be kept in the
state and not removed without the consent of the commission. The
commission could grant consent under such conditions as it might see
fit. The commission granted a telephone company permission to keep
its books at a central office in Pennsylvania provided: (1) The company
file a description of the books kept at the central office. (2)' The books
be not destroyed, discontinued or supplemented without the written
consent of the commission. (3) The books be produced promptly on
notice to the company's agent. (4) The company pay any reasonable
expense in any investigation incurred by the commission as a result of
the permission granted. (5) The company file a written acceptance of
35
the conditions.
Enough has been said to show that there are a variety of duties performed by utilities commissions outside of the decision of formally
contested cases, and that in performing these duties commissions resort
to their own knowledge and experience. Even in the decision of contested cases, where commissions perform work of the type done by
courts, there is still a well recognized field for the use of the commissions' own expert knowledge. Commissions in weighing evidence may
Re Guarantee & Deposit Rules & Disconnect Procedure, 11 P. U. R. (n.s.)
439 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935). See also Re Consumers Power Co., 11
P. U. R. (n.s.) 362 (Mich. P. Us. Comm. 1935) ; Re Issuance & Sale of Securities,
12 P. U. R. (n.s.) 9 (Dist. of Col. Us. Comm. 1935).
"Re Bronx Gas & E. Co., P. U. R. 1917 D 777 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm., 1st
Dist. 1917). Where a statute assesses costs of investigation against the utility
investigated, the commission has sole discretion to decide whether an investigation
should be made. Bronx Gas & E. Co. v. Maltbie, 268 N. Y. 278, 197 N. E. 281

(1935).

'Re N. J. Tel. Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 231 (N. J. Bd. of P. U. Commrs. 1935).
In Re Wash. Gas. Lt. Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 469 (Dist. of Col. P. Us. Comm.
1935) the commission pursuant to a statute approved a sliding scale arrangement
for rate fixing.
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value it in the light of their own experience. For example, in an
action by a railroad for an injunction against class rates fixed by the
Interstate Commerce Commission the carrier complained that part of
the evidence considered by the commission was a comparison with other
rates to the same destination from other points. These other rates, the
railroad contended, were compelled by competition and therefore not
comparable. But the United States Supreme Court said, in supporting
the commission, "The value of such evidence necessarily varies according to circumstances, 'but the weight to be given it is peculiarly for the
body experienced in 'such matters and familiar with the complexities,
intricacies and history of rate making in each section of the country."3 0
The fact that commissions may weigh the evidence in the exercise of
their expert judgment does not mean that the inexpert courts will never
step in and in substance reweigh the evidence for themselves.3 But at
all events they recognize that here is a proper use of the expert judgment
of the commissions, although the courts may reject the fruits.
Weighing evidence is, in part at least, a process of checking the
evidence against the experience accumulated in the mind of the commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission has gone farther, and
checked conflicting evidence in a rate case against its own official files.
The commission stoutly contended that in doing this it did not go beyond
the record, but "merely checked and verified statements and exhibits
appearing in the record." 38 Thus may weighing evidence approach the
line of taking into account evidence not introduced. Nevertheless, the
commission's position is logical, and similar conduct has received
judicial approval.3 9 If in weighing evidence a commission may bring
to bear its own experience, which is in effect drawing on something outside the record, why may it not in weighing evidence resort to specific
data not in the record? On the other hand, what the commission did
could be called flatly considering matter not in evidence. The procedure
can be made to look either valid or invalid by the language used to describe it, without departing from accuracy.
An example or two of th weighing process as commonly performed
by commissions may be useful to illustrate the application of their expert knowledge. In an Oregon rate case 40 the public utilities commissioner pointed out that an item of $35,000 for law expenditures in the
" I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 98, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 189, 57 L. ed. 431,

436 (1913).

'A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., supra note 23.
"3 Okla., etc. Ass'n v. Mo., K. & T. Ry., 39 I. C. C. 497, 500 (1916).
" City of Elizabeth v. Bd. of P. U. Commrs., 99 N. J. L. 496, 123 Atl. 358
(1924).
0 Re Pac. T. & T. Co., 8 P. U. R (n.s.) 61, 76 (Ore. P. Us. Commr. 1934).
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utility's evidence of expense during construction was to that amount in
excess of the actual experience of the company, because all law expenditures during construction were distributed to the various accounts
already considered. The company claimed $150,000 miscellaneous construction expenditures, but the commissioner pointed to an item for
contingencies and omissions, and stated that the record did not show
how the other miscellaneous construction expenditures accrued.
In a case before the Missouri commission its own engineers in arriving at reproduction cost had made an allowance for taxes during reproduction. The commission, in correcting the result, said, 41 "The taxes
allowed in the reproduction cost basis were based on the actual taxes
paid by the company on this property. A comparison was made of the
assessed value and the original cost and that ratio was applied to reproduction cost to determine the theoretical assessment. The actual tax
rate was then applied to this theoretical assessment to determine the
taxes paid.
"In our opinion this method of figuring taxes is erroneous. There
is no relation between the assessed value for taxation purposes and the
original cost of the property. If any relation does exist it is between
the assessed value and the reproduction cost less depreciation on the
date of the assessment. To determine the theoretical assessment on the
property when new, the ratio between the assessed value and the reproduction cost new less depreciation should be applied to the cost of reproduction new. The tax rate should then be applied to this theoretical
assessment to determine the amount of taxes that would be levied."
Here is a plain case for the use of the commission's own expert
knowledge. There is an error in the evidence visible to this body expert
in these matters, and of course the error should be corrected in weighing
the evidence. 42 The difference in result between the two methods was
said by the commission to be inconsequential; but the weighing process
is well illustrated.
Sometimes evidence is discarded altogether after having been
weighed and found wanting. A commission is not obliged to accept
evidence which happens to be uncontradicted, however fantastic it may
'Pub. Serv. Comm. of Mo. v. Ark.-Mo. Power Co., 8 P. U. R. (n.s.) 113, 118
(Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935).
"The method suggested by the commission may itself be subject to objection;

but at any rate its criticism of the method followed -by the engineers is well taken.
For another example of the use of expert knowledge in weighing evidence see
Bohannon v. Mt. States Power Co., 8 P. U. R (n.s.) 173, 175 (Mont. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1934). The commission approved of calculating the operating expense on
a certain rural line by taking the percentage of gross revenues going to operating
expenses on the whole system, and using that percentage of the gross revenues on
the rural line. The commission said the percentage did not "appear to be out of

line with the experience of like utilities."
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look in the light of the commission's experience.4 3 Conversely, the
expert nature of commissions has been utilized by some legislatures to
make available evidence which a court would reject. Thus some commissions may entertain hearsay evidence, and give it such weight as
44
the commission, expert in the field, deems it to deserve.
Commissions also use their expert knowledge in drawing conclusions
from evidence.4 5 What constitutes drawing a conclusion, as distinguished from taking into account additional evidence supplied by the
commission's own knowledge, is not always easy to say. The Wisconsin
court took an advanced view in this matter when it said, in supporting
a commission order establishing a freight rate on ice, "There is also a
vast amount of acquired expert knowledge which the commission may
apply to facts in evidence, as, for illustration, when the number of tons
hauled and the distance hauled and the whole cost is given, what part
of it usually and ordinarily represents terminal expenses; the usual proportion of terminal expenses to miles hauled; the usual and ordinary
ratio of distribution of freight charges according to the value of the
product carried; what allowance or increase is usually and ordinarily
made for size or bulk proportionate to weight; the average number of
tons carried in a car; the ordinary proportion of empty to loaded cars;
the ordinary consumption of fuel per train mile or per ton mile or per
passenger, and many other items of information which, while more difficult and complicated, are yet of the same nature as the expert knowledge
of a farmer with reference to the number of acres which should constitute a day's plowing; .. .a sailor with reference to the usual number of miles which should be made in a given time and in a given direction with a given direction and velocity of wind. None of these esti'See Ill. Commerce Comm. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 4 P. U. R. (n.s.) 1, 20 (Ill.
Commerce Comm. 1934) ; Steenerson v. Gt. No. Ry., supra note 10, 72 N. W. at
718. In the latter case evidence in favor of a charge for interest, discounts and

commissions of 10% on the cost of construction of a railroad was uncontradicted,
but the supreme court itself pointed out that 10% was reasonable interest for more
than two years, that the railroad ran through fertile and populous territory, and
would not all lie unproductive for two years. If the court may use its general
knowledge to attack evidence all one way, may not the commission use its expert
knowledge to the same end?
" Wheat, loc. cit. supra note 18.
'See Customers v. Lowell Gas Lt. Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 111 (Mass. Dep't

of P. Us. 1935). A gas company had applied for increased rates. It showed increases in certain items of expense amounting to $7,310.

The commission coun-

tered in its opinion, -page 114, "It is probable that a substantial amount of these
increases are due to the increased activity in the sale of appliances. If we assume

that two thirds of he total of the increases mentioned were due to activities in
the promotion of sales of appliances, which seems reasonable," then that sum
should be deducted from operating expenses.

The commission mentioned no

evidence that any part of the increased expenses were incurred in sale of appliances; that was a conclusion deduced by the commission from the fact that
there was increased activity in the sale of appliances.
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mates are mathematically accurate, but long practice in making estimates
of that kind makes one an expert." 46
Not infrequently what might appear as a finding without evidence to
support it turns out to be a finding supported by a deduction from
evidence. The number of subscribers of a small telephone system decreased from 187 to 98. The Wisconsin commission deduced that there
was property no longer useful in serving the public, and accordingly
pared the rate base. 47 Can it be said that the commission here acted
without evidence that there was excess plant because so far as appears
no engineering witness said so? Hardly. From the dwindling number
of subscribers it is plain that the plant has become excessive for those
left.
It is apparent that conclusions drawn by expert commissions from
evidence may be used where direct evidence could have been used instead.
Sometimes commissions draw conclusions from evidence which are
different from those which the evidence was introduced to support. A
telephone company put in evidence the actual cost of its properties as
they were accumulated. The commission, independently, calculated from
the company's evidence the amount of its property acquired between
1916 and 1930, and reduced the original cost figures by reason of the
fall in the price level after 1930. The company's own evidence was thus
made the basis for deducing a value considerably less than the company's evidence purported to show. In the same case the company's
figures as to cost of reproduction were used to arrive at a lower figure
because the commission believed the company's calculations gave too
much weight to actual costs of construction during recent years. The
actual construction consisted of small jobs, whereas the commission
thought that on reproduction of the properties the economies of large
48
scale construction would result.
" Chic. & N. W. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., supra note 10, 145 N. W. at 218.
Fink v. Fremont Tel. Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 142 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm.
"7

1935).

'Re So. Bell T. & T. Co., 7 P. U. R. (n.s.) 21 (N. C. Us. Comm. 1934).

See

City of Grand Forks v. Red River Power Co., 8 P. U. R. (ts.) 225, 245 (N. D.

Bd. of R. R. Commrs. 1935) (rejecting a charge of 2Y/o for management and
supervision). In the case of Re N. W. Bell Tel. Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 337 (Neb.
State Ry. Comm. 1935) the company's evidence supported a composite depreciation
rate of 4.4101. According to the dissent, the commission's own engineering staff
set the figure at 4.15%. The commission, after calculations of its own, arrived

at a rate of 3.82%.

In examining commission decisions it is not always easy to tell whether a commission, in drawing from evidence a conclusion different from that intended by
the larty introducing it, is resorting to its own expert knowledge, or whether it
is relying on other evidence in the record but not mentioned. A typical instance
is to be found in Town of Springfield v. Highland Us. Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.)
381, 386 (Colo. P. Us. Comm. 1935), where the commission said, "No allowance is
made for 'engineering and supervision' as in our opinion this item was amply taken
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Even where all the evidence there is in a case is presented by a utility
to support its position, the commission may decide against the utility
by drawing from its evidence a conclusion opposite to that which the
evidence was introduced to further.4 9 Such a result is perfectly defensible. If the experienced judgment of the commission applied to
evidence leads to a certain conclusion, then that conclusion is justified
by evidence, and it is immaterial who introduced the evidence or for
what purpose. There is a difference between evidence all one way, and
evidence all presented by one side.
There is, then, considerable latitude for the expert knowledge of
commissions in weighing evidence and drawing conclusions from it.
In practice the official evidence will not only be weighed and made to
yield conclusions, but will be supplemented and contradicted by other
evidence, not in the record, drawn from the experience of the commission. The commission may not recite this truth in its opinion; may
not even be conscious that there is any such truth. There may be
evidence in the record both ways; the evidence one way may look good
to the commission because it is supported by a number of reports and
data which have left their effect on the commission's mind. If, then,
the real basis for a commission's conclusion even in the presence of
evidence is what the commission already knows, why not let the commission make decisions solely on what it knows, that is, decisions without any record evidence at all? The effect of the rule requiring the
support of record evidence, it may be argued, is merely to force the commission to make a window display of evidence in the record. The
answer has already been suggested. By requiring the window display
there will be secured verification of the commission's impressions from
its experience.
Another fashion in which the expert nature of commissions may
care of in the appraisal figures of defendant's inventory." No testimony supporting any such conclusion is referred to. This is natural. The commission sees
what it believes to be a double charge, and promptly strikes it out. The commission simply has in mind no such problem as whether it can decide contrary to the
sole evidence on the point. Some cases where commissions appear to draw on their
own judgment, experience or knowledge may be nothing more than instances where
the commissions had, but did not mention, record evidence to support their views.
However, the fact that in such cases as the one above the commissions feel no need
to refer to any record evidence is significant.
"Eager v. P. Us. Comm., 113 Ohio St. 604, 149 N. E. 865 (1925) ; Re 0. B.
McCoy, 8 P. U. R. (n.s.) 322 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1934) (Application for
authority to transfer a telephone system to a purchaser, most of the price to be
paid monthly and to be secured by a mortgage on the property. The Commission
looked into the revenue of the company, intimated that the proceeds might be insufficient to enable the purchaser to meet the payments called for, and denied
authority to transfer the property when so large a mortgage would be incurred.
So far as appears there was no evidence introduced against the application; the
commission reached its conclusion solely by analysis of evidence presented for a
contrary result.)
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be put to use in deciding cases is in the resort to principle or policy, as
seen by expert eyes. Such principle or policy may be brought into the
balance to outweigh evidence. Application was made for approval of
loans by an operating to a holding company, which loans paid the
operating company only one and one-fourth per cent in 1934. The commission refused approval partly on the ground that the excess cash of
the operating company might better be used to retire its preferred stock
on which it had to pay five per cent. No reference was made to any
testimony against that of the petitioner. 50
Not only may commissions resort to policy in the sense of sound
principle, but they may likewise establish policies in the sense of rules.
An application by a Pennsylvania gas company to issue stock to its holding company in order to acquire from the holding company stock in a
Virginia gas company was denied by the Pennsylvania commission.
The commission stated and applied its policy of approving security
issues by a utility only for purposes related to the rendition of its public
service.5 1 Certainly in the decision of many cases the commissions
should be permitted to establish doctrines or policies which can be
applied in like cases without going into the same old lines of evidence
which were already considered in the cases wherein the policies were
formulated. The policies established -by commissions may amount in
effect to rules of law for their own guidance, and the guidance of the
utilities within their jurisdiction. The question arose whether a considerable variety of contributions by an electric company were allowable
operating expenses. One class of contributions was to organizations
designed to stimulate trade and increase population in the company's
territory. The commission, without mentioning any decision or statute,
stated the test to be whether the beneficiary is principally devoted to
'Re The Peoples Nat. Gas Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 20 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1935). In the case of Re Nekoosa Edwards L. & P. Co., supra note 31, a flat rate
for energy purchased wholesale was disapproved, and a demand and energy type
of rate recommended. Conversely in Re Conowingo Power Co., mtpra note 32 at
364, the commission disapproved a demand and energy charge for small users. No
evidence was cited, but rather reasons of policy. Additional cases where commissions resorted to policy to arrive at decisions are Re Consolidated Water
Power Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 448, 457 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935) (fixed
charge rate approved); Re M & M Pipe Line Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 234, 254
(Tex. R. R. Comm. 1935) (Donations to worthy causes disallowed as an operating
expense. They should come out of profits.); Re N. W. Elec. Co., 11 P. U. R.
(n.s.) 227 (Ore. P. Us. Commr. 1935) (Salary allowed retired president who had
no substantial duties was a pension, which could not be charged as an operating
expense.).
For cases in which commissions resorted to policy in the performance of legislative or supervisory functions see Re Uniform Classification of Accounts, 8 P. U.
R. (n.s.) 349, 358 (N. H. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1934) (The commission required
certain separate accounts relating to sales of appliances, contrary to the position
taken by all the companies involved.) ; Re Cal. Ore. Power Co., 8 P. U. R. (n.s.)
412 (Ore. P. Us. Commr. 1934).
'Re Pa. Gas & E. Co., 10 P. U. R. (is.) 236 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935).
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effort reasonably tending to stimulate sale of the company's products.
On this basis a contribution by a company operating in Oregon to the
Portland Chamber of Commerce was approved, but a contribution to
2
the United States Chamber of Commerce rejected.
JUDIcIAL NOTICE BY UTILITIES COMMISSIONS
One of the most promising fields for the wider use by commissions
of their own expert knowledge and accumulated data lies in the expansion taking place in the scope of the doctrine of judicial notice as
applied by administrative tribunals. 53 Judicial notice is a device much
used by courts. It is said to be taken where propositions in a party's
case are accepted as true without the need of evidence.5 4 Judicial notice
may be taken by courts of
"(1) Matters which are so notorious to all that the production of
evidence would be unnecessary;
"(2) Matters which the judicial function supposes the judge to be
acquainted with, either actually or in theory."55
If courts may accept as true without evidence matters with which
judges are supposed to be acquainted, certainly commissions should
have authority to accept as true without evidence matters with which expert tribunals are supposed to be acquainted. Since a commission is an
expert body the scope of what it judicially knows should be broader in
its own sphere than what a non-expert court judicially knows in that
sphere. 56 An examination will be made at this point to determine the
extent to which the doctrine has been used by commissions, and that
use approved by the courts.57
It is said that commissions may take judicial notice of the same
'Re N. W. Electric Co., supra note 50. In Pub. Serv. Comm. of Mo. v. Mo.

Power & Lt. Co., 10 P. U R. (n.s.) 8 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935) the commission laid down the principle that making the rural rates for customers on one
inter-connected company system depend to any great extent on the rate in the
nearest town was discrimination; all rural subscribers should be served on the
same terms as nearly as possible. Additional instances where commissions have
in effect laid down rules of law or policies in their decisions are City of Grand
Forks v. Red River Power Co., supra note 48 at 246 (If rates are unreasonable,
the company's expense in defending those rates will not be allowed as an operating
expense); Re Markesan Tel. Co., 11 P. U. R. (n.s.) 280 (Wis. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1935) (Toll calls moving from A to B should pay the same amount as identical
calls moving from B to A.)
0 (1931) 29 MIcH. L. REv. 765.
5 WIGmoR , EviDFNCEc (1923) §2565.
Id.., §2571.

Cf. (1914) 27 H-aiv. L. REv. 683.
In examination of commission decisions it is frequently difficult to tell whether
the commission is resorting to judicial notice or merely to evidence introduced but
not mentioned. A utility presents data in evidence. The commission in its opinion
counters with other data. The commission often does not say where it found the
other data, whether in the evidence or elsewhere. An attempt has been made to
select for use herein only cases where it appeared likely that the other data was
judicially noticed by the commission, rather than taken from the record evidence.
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Both commissions and courts take notice of

facts in the utility field "so notorious to all that the production of
evidence would be unnecessary."

59

Whether a commission may take judicial notice of data contained in
its files is the subject of a split of authority. The Federal rule is that a
utilities commission may not found a decision in litigation before it on
information in its files without putting in evidence the matter relied
on.6 0 This rule is peculiar, in view of Federal 61 as well as state decisions 62 holding that other types of administrative tribunals may take
judicial notice of matter contained in their -files and records.

However,

this is not the only instance in which a more stringent rule has been laid
down for utility commissions than for other administrative bodies. The
holding that where the question of confiscation is raised a court on reviewing a commission decision prescribing rates for a utility must have
the privilege of forming an independent judgment on both law and
facts 63 is a familiar example.

It has been held contrary to the Federal

position, that a utilities commission may take judicial notice of material
in its files, since the latter are public records.6 4 Further, one state court
said that the court itself would take judicial cognizance of the classifica'See Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. P. Us. Comm., 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d)
287, 290 (1932).
Chambersburg Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 116 Pa. Super. Ct. 196, 176 Atl.
794, 804 (1935) (rapid changes in manufacturing processes of all kinds, necessitating the junking of machinery and the replacing of it with more efficient equipment) ; Hammond Lbr. Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 156 I. C. C. 731, 734 (1929) (certain
traffic to reach Denver must encounter heavy grades and curves in the Rocky
Mountains); Re Passenger Fares, (P. U. R. 1916 E. 719, 745 (N. Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm., 2nd Dist., 1916) (In recent years all railroads have been subjected to increased operating costs, due to installation of heavier rails, increased cost of labor,
etc. But increased rates could not be granted on this ground alone, since the commission did not know what the additional burden on this railroad was.). In the
case of Re The Peoples Nat. Gas. Co., supra note 50, at 23, the commission referred to the fact that the present rate of interest on time deposits was 2Y2%, the
lowest figure in many years, but referred to no evidence of the fact. In City of
Memphis v. So. Bell T. & T. Co., 6 P. U. R. (n.s.) 464 (P. Us. Comm. of Tenn.
1934) the commission in considering the bearing of value for tax purposes on value
for rate making purposes said that the commission would take into account its
judicial knowledge of how the value for tax purposes was arrived at. The commission under the laws of Tennessee had the duty of fixing values of utility
properties for tax purposes.
' Notes 15, 19 supra.
Halpern v. Andrews, 21 F. (2d) 969 (E. D. Pa. 1927) ; Tang Tun v. Edsell,
223 U. S.673, 681, 32 Sup. Ct. 359, 363, 56 L. ed. 606, 610 (1912). In this latter
type of case (Chinese exclusion case) the administrative decision is final unless
the officers acted unlawfully, etc. Use of material from the official files, which
occurred here, is therefore not unlawful in view of the decision upholding the
administrative action.
' Anderson v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 27 Cal. App. 336, 149 Pac. 1006 (1915);
Homan v. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 202 Cal. 593, 262 Pac. 324 (1927).
1 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S.287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527,
64 L. ed. 908 (1920).
" Chic. & N. W. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., supra note 10.
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tions and rates of the railroad commission. 65 If the court will take
judicial notice of this data on file with the commission, then since commissions may take judicial notice of the same facts as courts, the commission also may take judicial notice of this data.
When the data in the commission files consists of reports of the
very utility now a party in the case before the commission, taking
judicial notice of the data0 8 seems clearly proper. The contrary view 07
has little to recommend it. True, the reports made to the commission
over the years may be voluminous, and the utility may not know just
what portion of this data will be used against it, but the answer is that
all the reports should be true; there is no occasion for the utility to
refute them, and the utility should expect the commission to act on the
utility's own reports or any portion of them. A rule allowing the company's reports to be judicially noticed against it might stimulate care in
making them. The merits of the matter may be illustrated by a case
before the Illinois commission wherein an application was made for increased gas rates. The evidence showed that for the first eight months
of 1921 the company suffered a deficit of $440. The commission took
judicial notice of the quarterly accounting reports filed by the utility
with the commission showing that for the whole year the company
earned net $2,104.8 It would be a plain miscarriage of justice if the
commission were obliged to assume the company lost money in 1921
when the commission knew -better. Further, it is hard to see anything
but an absurd legal formality in requiring a reopening of the case in
order to introduce against the company its own official report that it
had made a net earning in 1921.
The position of the Illinois commission in the above case is rendered
of doubtful legality by a decision of the Illinois court on a related point,
namely, whether a commission may take judicial notice of its own decisions and orders. The Illinois commission in reducing railroad rates
on coal made a comparison of the rates in question with other rates,
which other rates it ascertained from its own past order prescribing
'See Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Butler Marble & Granite Co., 8 Ga. App. 1, 68
S. E. 775, 778 (1910). Contra, Reinschmidt v. L. & N. Ry., 112 Fla. 267, 150 So.

266 (1933).

Chic. & N. W. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., supra note 10; Pub. Serv. Comm. of Mo.
v. Empire Dist. Elec. Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 302, 308 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1935) ; Customers v. Rockland Light & P. Co., P. U. R. 1920 A 754, 755 (N. Y.

Pub. Serv. Comm., 2nd Dist., 1919). In each of these commission cases judicial
notice was taken of the company's reports. The decision was favorable to the
company. See Duluth St. Ry. v. R. R. Comm., 161 Wis. 245, 152 N. W. 887, 891

(1915).
'U. S. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 44 Sup. Ct. 565, 68 L. ed. 1016
(1924) ; see Campbell v. Hood River Gas & E. Co., P. U. R. 1915 D 855, 862 (Ore.

Pub. Serv. Comm. 1915).

'Re Central Ill. Lt. Co., P. U. R. 1923 A 445 (I1. Commerce Comm. 1922).
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them. The court held that this was improper since the order was not
introduced in evidence. 69 The court fell back on the familiar doctrine,
already referred to at length herein, that nothing can be treated as
evidence which is not introduced as such. It may be said in defense of
the court's position that the railroad could not dispute before the commission the comparability of the rates in the past order unless it was
advised that they would be considered. It will be shown hereinafter
that an opportunity to dispute the comparability can be provided without the necessity for formal presentation in evidence. There is authority opposed to the Illinois view on judicial notice by a commission of its
70
own decisions and orders.
Commissions not infrequently consider records from previous hearings without having them introduced in evidence.7 1 Some of the instances in which it has been done illustrate the good sense of so doing.
In an electric rate case the commission had before it no evidence on
what constituted a fair rate of return on the value of the company's
property. The commission on the -basis of evidence submitted in other
72
recent cases before it fixed the return at six and one-half per cent.
Why not? Why should the commission in every new case before it be
obliged to have put in the record the same old evidence as to what constitutes a fair return in that locality at the time? There may be reason
in obliging the commission to hear and consider any new evidence on
the familiar subject the utility may have to offer. Beyond that the doctrine that commissions may act only on evidence introduced becomes an
obstructive legal formality in deciding such a point as this.78
The Interstate Commerce Commission had before it the question as
to the reasonableness of 15,000 pounds as a minimum carload of dresesd
poultry for which defendant railroad would furnish free icing. The
commission said that it had had occasion in many cases to consider the
reasonableness of icing charges, and in accord with the conclusions
reached in those cases it could not now find the 15,000 pound minimum
requirement unreasonable. 74 The commission's course in considering
what it had done in past cases was essential unless the commission were
'

Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., sipranote 23, 167 N. E. at 836.

The court likewise held it improper to take into account facts found by the I. C. C.
in a case before it.
' Wheat, op. cit. supra note 18, at 467; Chic. & N. W Ry. v. R. R. Comm.,
supra note 10, 145 N. W. at 220. In Central of Ga. Ry. v. Cook & Lockett, 4 Ga.
App. 701, 62 S. E. 464 (1908) the court itself took judicial notice of a commission
rule exempting railroads from accepting goods not in a safe condition for shipnent. See also note 65.
Customers v. Rockland Light & P. Co., supra note 66.
Pub. Serv. Comm. of Mo. v. Ark.-Mo. Power Co., supra note 41.
See also Faris, .udicial Notice by Administrative Bodies (1928) 4 Ind. L. J.
167, 178-80.
" Swift & Co. v. Chic. & A. R. R., 16 I. C. C. 426, 429 (1909).
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to change its ruling on the reasonableness of the minimum requirement
with each new case, according to what evidence was introduced therein.
Of course, the commission could put all the past records and decisions
in evidence, but would any essential purpose be served by doing so?
In a recent Utah case the court held that the commission could not
consider the evidence received in a comparable case 'but not made a part
of the record. The action was brought by a railroad before the commission to discontinue an agency station at a place called Faust. The
question arose whether the commission could consider evidence in a case
involving the St. John station, 12.8 miles east of Faust. The court
said, 75 "The physical conditions at both stations are practically the
same. It is semi-desert country. . . . Can the commission take into consideration the knowledge that it received at the hearing in the St. John
Station Case as to the methods, practices, and incidents attendant to the
shipping of live stock to and from St. John and apply it to this case
because the two stations exist under essentially similar physical conditions and serve communities engaged in similar pursuits and living
under similar conditions? Naturally, if shippers of live stock to and
from St. John would have certain difficulties or inconveniences regarding the forwarding or receiving of carload lots of sheep, it would not
take a very great imagination to conceive that shippers of sheep patronizing a station 12.8 miles west situated under essentially the same conditions would have the same difficulties. But can the commission consider
such fact without specific evidence introduced in this case? If the two
hearings had been consolidated, there would have been no question. But
there were separate applications to the commission, separate hearings
were had, so consequently they constitute separate cases. The evidence
adduced in the St. John Station Case in this regard can not be considered as evidence adduced in this case."
The court is obviously the prey of an uneasy feeling that good sense
is here sacrificed by importing into commission hearings the standards
applicable to courts, but the weight of the familiar is too strong for the
.court. From the first portion of the quoted language we might have
expected the court to strike out boldly into new territory, to declare
that commissions are not courts, and that in order to utilize their unique
functions and capacities to the full, a different technique must be worked
out for them. The departure could have been reconciled with existing
concepts by expanding the idea of judicial notice.
In contrast with the Utah decisionis the long forward step taken by
the New Jersey court 70 when it decided that the commission in a rate
Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. P. Us. Comm., sup ra note 58, 17 P. (2d) at 290.
City of Elizabeth v. Bd. of P. U. Commrs. mtpra note 39; see Re Mo. Standard Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1928 C 695, 700 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1928).
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case might use the knowledge of unit prices it had obtained in other
proceedings. The value of such a rule to commissions in rate case
valuations can scarcely be overestimated. If a utility, for example, puts
in evidence that the reasonable cost of a certain type of pole installed is
fifteen dollars, and the commission knows from its experience in other
cases that the cost to other comparable companies averages ten dollars,
the commission is in a position to cut the utility's -figure.
An application of the doctrine of judicial notice has been made
which may prove a growing point for the use of the doctrine by commissions. Judicial notice of the depression was taken by courts generally, together with notice of such consequences as the difficulty experienced by railroads in carrying their financial burdens,7 the fact that
few companies have been able to earn 4.98% on the value of their
property, s and that profound changes in values, cost of service, volume
of consumption, and reasonable return on investments have taken
place7 9 Judicial notice of the price level and its changes or failure to
change has also been commonly taken.8 0 Logical extension of the doctrine that consequences of depressed conditions, and changes in the
price level, may be judicially noticed should prove of value in enabling
commissions to bring into use their own knowledge, particularly in the
important and constant work of valuation attendant on rate regulation.
Much of the detail of rate fixing depends on fluctuations in the price
level, affecting the fair value of utility property and fair return thereon.
While commissions and courts have been feeling their way in developing the doctrine of judicial notice by commissions as applied to
specific matters such as those above mentioned, they have also been
searching for some general principle ruling use of judicial notice by
commissions. The Interstate Commerce Commission early put forward
a view which would have reached the end at the very beginning. As
" Central R. R.

v. Bd. of P. U. Commrs., 112 N. J. L. 215, 170 Atl. 246 (1934).

" The court therefore held a return of 4.98% to be not confiscatory. Alexandria

Water Co. v. City Council of Alexandria, 163 Va. 512, 177 S. E. 454, 495 (1934).
The I. C. C. noticed that credit conditions were unfavorable, and that demand for
all commodities had slackened. Cal. Growers', etc. League v. So. Pac. Co., 185
I. C. C. 299, 322 (1932). The Minnesota court long before this had taken judicial
notice of a general drop in interest rates and income on capital. Steenerson v. Gt.
No. Ry., supra note 10, 72 N. W. at 719.
' Central Ky. Nat. Gas Co. v. R. R. Comm. of Ky., 290 U. S. 264, 274, 54 Sup.
Ct. 154, 158, 78 L. ed. 307 (1933).
' McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 412, 47 Sup. Ct 144, 149,
71 L. ed. 316, 325 (1926); A. T. & S. F. Ry. v. U. S., 284 U. S. 248, 52 Sup. Ct
146, 76 L. ed. 273 (1932); Alexandria Water Co. v. City Council of Alexandria,
supra note 78, 177 S. E. at 494; La. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. La. P. Us. Co., P. U. R.
1931 C 170, 173 (La. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1931) ; Roessler & H. Chem. Co. v. Chic.
& N. W. Ry., 183 I. C. C. 496, 497 (1932) ; Re Central Ill. Lt. Co., supra note 68
at 447; Re Leadville Water Co., P. U. R. 1931 D 366, 378 (Colo. P. Us. Comm.
1931) ; I1. Commerce Comm. v. Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 43. fontra, Pa. R. R.
v. Bd. of P. U. Commrs., 13 N. J. Misc. 766, 180 Atl. 551 (1935).
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already pointed out herein, the commission said that judicial notice "is
extended in the case of the Commission to the entire range of its experience with transportation problems and embraces all the knowledge
that it has gathered from any source." 8' The Utah court cautiously
asserted a more limited scope for judicial notice by commissions when
it said, "The commission may also, perhaps, take judicial notice of such
facts and practices as are generally known throughout the whole field of
railroad transportation; that is, such facts which are practically universal among operatives in the field to which the jurisdiction of the commission extends, although they may not be known to the world generally,
but it can not take its special knowledge which it may have gained from
experience or from other hearings and base any findings or conclusions
82
upon such knowledge."
Commissions in practice not only take notice of specific information
such as reports, but likewise draw on the fruits of their own general
experience. It might be said that they take notice of their own experience, although they commonly do not bother to justify themselves
88
by asserting any such legal explanation.
EFFECT OF FEDERAL RULE ON STATE RULE AS TO JUDICIAL NOTICE

It has already been suggested that the doctrine of judicial notice
should be expanded in the case of commissions by reason of their more
extended knowledge in their own fields. The question arises whether,
if a state court or statute lays down a broad rule as to the scope of
judicial notice by a state commission, that rule may be overturned by
the United States Supreme Court pursuant to its doctrine, already discussed, that a commission must decide cases before it on the evidence
presented. The writer has found no Supreme Court case on this pre8

Joynes v. Pa. R. R., supra note 9. See also Halpern v. Andrews, supranote 61
at 971, concerning use of his own knowledge by a prohibition commissioner.

Los Angeles & S. L. R. R. v. P. Us. Comm., .upra note 58, 17 P. (2d) at 291.
'Re So. Bell T. & T. Co., supra note 48, at 28 (commission drew on its whole
experience in arriving at value) ; Dep't of Pub. Wks. v. Ore.-Wash. Water Service
Co., 8 P. U. X. (n.s.) 293, 313 (Wash. Dep't of Pub. Wks. 1934) ; Re Nekoosa
Edwards L. & P. Co., supra note 31 at 53 (The commission apparently drew on its
experience as to usual salaries for utilities of this size.) ; Beckley v. Otter Tail
Pow. Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 105, 107 (N. D. Bd. of R. R. Commrs. 1935) (The
commission probably drew on its experience for the conclusion that a construction
cost of a short electric line at a rate of $3200 per mile was excessive.) ; Customers v. Lowell Gas Lt. Co., supra n6te 45 at 113 (experience of commission apparently used in concluding that management services furnished a utility could
have been supplied by itself at a lower cost) ; Re M & M Pipe Line Co., supra
note 50 at 249 (Gasoline consumed by ditching machines, since not consumed by a
motor vehicle using the highways, would be subject to a refund of 4 cents per
gallon. The commission corrected the evidence of the engineers as to cost of
gasoline.) ; Re Wis. Central Utilities Co., 12 P. U. R. (n.s.) 4, 8 (Wis. Pub, Serv.
Comm. 1935) (5% a reasonable interest rate on notes); Re Gravity Water Co.,
10 P. U. R. (n.s.) 38, 41 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935) (Salary of $1,753 unreasonable for the manager of a water company of this size).
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cise point.84 The scope of judicial notice should be a question for the
determination of the states as a matter of the rules of evidence in their
own tribunals. Any judicial notice at all would be precluded by a
literal enforcement of the doctrine that decisions must be supported by
record evidence. It is already settled beyond cavil that this doctrine is
modified by the other doctrine that "both commissions and courts may
resort to judicial notice. The reasonable scope of the latter doctrine
should be a matter for the state tribunals, to be interfered with in the
name of due process only when the bounds of reasonableness have been
passed.
SOLUTIONS

Superficially it would appear to be an easy matter for commissions
to introduce in evidence any accumulated data from their files on which
they may rely, thus avoiding the whole problem above discussed so far
as it relates to such data. The practical difficulty is that it is not known
until the company's case is in which data will prove most applicable to
the-problem in hand. The company's evidence may be replete with figures inconsistent with its own previous reports; that can be known only
on examination after the company's evidence is before the commission.
This difficulty could be met by setting a time between the presentation
of the company's case, and the presentation of the adverse case, toenable the commission to search its files. This remedy has the drawback that it would result in delay where too much delay exists already,
and that pressure of other business is sometimes too great to enable the
commission to make the search in any set time. Moreover, the remedy
would not touch the situation where the commission proposes to bring
into play its own expert knowledge. A simpler and more workable
solution would be to enable the commisson, after the case has been tried,
to make its decision, using its own data and expert knowledge, specifying the data and knowledge relied on in its opinion, and then to give
the utility or other party a suitable time within which to bring on a
further hearing for the purpose of questioning the data or knowledge
relied on by the commission. This simple device, which could be estab"In Ill. Cent. R R. v. R. R. Comm. of Ky., supra note 19, the Federal district
court held that a state commission could be restrained from enforcing rates arrived
at by comparison with other rates filed with the commission by the very railroad
now before the commission, the other rates not being in evidence. But it did not
appear that the commission relied on judicial notice sanctioned by the state law.
L. & N. R. R. v. Finn, 235 U. S. 601, 606, 35 Sup. Ct. 146, 149, 59 L. ed. 379, 383
(1915) expressly leaves undecided whether the rule confining the I. C. C. to the
evidence in hand is applicable under the due process clause to state commissions
at all or not. Later cases indicate that it is. See notes 17 and 18. But even
though state commissions by virtue of the due process clause must act upon the
evidence, the question still remains as to the proper scope of judicial notice since
courts, which likewise act on the evidence, nevertheless take judicial notice in
proper cases.
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lished by statute, would meet the substantial objection already expounded herein to the use of matter outside the record by commissions,
namely that the utility or other party affected has no opportunity to
know and meet the case against it.8 5 The device would probably forestall the danger of overturn of the commission decisions by the United
States Supreine Court.8 6 Utilities which had genuine reason to call into
question the data and information used by the commission could do so,
thus protecting themselves from data which they could disprove or
offset. At the same time they could not, as now, use the pretext of lack
of opportunity to meet the case against them as a means of keeping
from consideration important information which is the fruit of the close
contact the commissions have with utility operations.
Either an expanded doctrine of judicial notice,8 7 or a statute as
above suggested, would offer means whereby commissions could use their
own data and knowledge. When the commission's decision then came
to a court for review in a situation where the court merely looks to see
if there is evidence sufficient to support the commission, 88 obviously
'Where the requirements of notice of the matter to be considered, and an opportunity to make a showing against it, are met, the matter may properly be taken

into account. Steamboat Canal Co. v. Garson, 43 Nev. 298, 185 Pac. 801 (1919)
(evidence at former hearings) ; cf. I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 93, 33

Sup. Ct. 185, 187, 57 L. ed. 431, 434 (1913); U. S. v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U. S.
274, 44 Sup. Ct. 565, 68 L. ed. 1016 (1924) ; Wichita R. & Lt Co. v. Ct. of Indus.
Relations, 113 Kan. 297, 214 Pac. 797, 807 (1923); Appalachian Power Co. v.
Commonwealth, supra note 20; Duluth St. Ry. v. R. R. Comm. of Wis., 161 Wis.
245, 152 N. W. 887 (1915); Hoffman v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 99 Pa. Super. 417
(1930) ; Report, Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932) 79(i i), 99(13b), 106
(2nd paragraph).
In U. S. v. Abilene & So. Ry. Co., 265 U. S. 274, 289 n., 44 Sup. Ct. 565,
570 n., 68 L. ed. 1016, 1023 n. (1924) the court suggested a reopening in order to
permit the commission to introduce in the record data from the commission's files.
It is hard to see any purpose which such a procedure would serve that would not
be better served by the statute suggested. The latter would have the advantage
that only in case the utility seriously contested the data used by the commission
would a hearing on the data be brought on by the utility.
7 Faris, op. cit. supra note 73 at 181 argues for the widest latitude for commissions in taking judicial notice, especially of subject matter within their special
fields. He suggests that where a fact judicially noticed by a commission is called
into question, the contestant should be required to prove the truth, rather than the
commission reversed for not confining itself to the record. Note (1934) 44 Yas
L. J. 355 also argues for broad application of the doctrine of judicial notice by
administrative bodies.
I I. C. C. v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. ed. 308
(1912); I. C. C. v. L. & N. R. R., 227 U. S. 88, 33 Sup. Ct. 185, 57 L. ed. 431
(1913); Los Angeles & S. L. Ry. v. P. Us. Comm., mtpra note 58; City of
Elizabeth v. Bd. of P. U. Commrs., supra note 39; N. W. Bell Tel. Co. v. Neb.
State Ry. Comm., 128 Neb. 447, 259 N. W. 362 (1935) ; State v. Pub. Serv. Comm.
of Mo., 335 Mo. 1248, 76 S. W. (2d) 343 (1934) ; (1927) 21 ILL. L. REV. 624; DxcKixso, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) 190; cf.
Fla. E. C. Ry. v. U. S., 234 U. S. 167, 34 Sup. Ct. 867, 58 L. ed. 1267 (1914). In
Atchison T. & S. F. Ry. v. Commerce Comm., supra note 23, the court itself
weighed the value of certain rate comparisons made by the commission; in I. C. C.
v. L. & N. R. R., 227 U. S. at 9& the court said the weight to be given, such evi-
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the court should take judicial notice of what the commission judicially
noticed ;89 or, under the proposed statute, the court should take into account the matter introduced in the commission's decision, together with
any matter introduced -bythe utility or other parties at the later hearing.
Even where the court exercises an independent judgment on the facts,9 0
the court should consider the facts judicially noticed by the commission,
or the facts set out in its opinion. More than that, the commission's
decision itself is a fact, 91 entitled to at least as much weight as the
opinion of an expert witness.
Statutes making findings of commissions prima fade true, or clothing
them with a presumption of correctness 92 do not meet the needs cared
for by the suggestions above, for even where by statute the findings of
a commission are prima facie true they must be supported by evidence.9 3
RULE

FORMATION BY COMMISSIONS INSTEAD OF COURTS

The fact that commissions make rules of law in much the same
fashion as courts make them has already been mentioned. If the expert
nature of commissions is to be put to its fullest use, the courts should
leave the widest possible room for this process on the part of commisdence was for the commission. Both courts started with the rule that the commission would be sustained if there was substantial evidence to support its order.
' See Steenerson v. Gt. No. Ry., supra note 10, 72 N. W. at 716.
'Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct.
527, 64 L. ed. 908 (1920) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 56 Sup. Ct. 720,
80 L. ed. 679 (1936). See the Report of the Special Committee on Administrative
Law (1934) 59 A. B. A. Rep. 539, 546, advocating judicial determination of issues
of fact on review of all administrative decisions. Cf. Report, Committee on Ministers' Powers (1932) 108. In some jurisdictions on appeal from the commission a
trial is had de novo. Duluth St. Ry. v. R. R. Comm. of Wis., supra note 85, 152
N. W. at 891. The suggestions made in the text above would be equally applicable
to this type of review.
" Cf. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 56 Sup. Ct. 720, 726, 80 L. ed. 679
(1936). Findings of commissions should themselves be treated as evidence in
their own support in cases where the court is forming an independent judgment
on the law and facts, but not in cases where the court is looking to see if the
commission was supported by substantial evidence, otherwise the commission
always would be so supported. In Ill. Cent. R. R_ v. I. C. C., 206 U. S. 441, 454,
27 Sup. Ct. 700, 704, 51 L. ed. 1128, 1134 (1907) the court said that in cases of
conflicting evidence a probative force would be attributed to the findings of the
commission. There is not much nourishment in this remark if it was intended
to be applicable only to the case in hand for the case was one of the type where
the orders of the commission if supported by evidence are final. I. C. C. v. Union
Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 547, 32 Sup. Ct 108, 111, 56 L. ed. 308, 311 (1912).
Hence if there was conflicting evidence the commission's decision was already final
and needed no probative force. The court's point that probative force should be
given the findings of the commission has weight if applied to cases where the
court is forming an independent judgment on the facts.
'A constitutional provision raising a presumption that the order of the commission is just, reasonable and correct was applied in City of Tulsa v. State Corp.
Comm., 169 Okla. 455, 37 P. (2d) 619 (1934).
'I.
C. C. v. Union Pac. R. R., 222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108, 56 L. ed. 308

(1912).
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sions. Mr. Dickinson 9 4 suggests that administrative bodies may do
some of the rule formulating in their fields, but he thinks their knowledge is too specialized to enable them to be successful at formulating
general rules, which must "take into account the habits and attitude of
mind of the whole community as gleaned from the sum-total of its
transactions." 95 There is force in this argument. It might be added
that rules must be fitted into the wider scheme of law as a body, and
courts are more familiar with the whole body of the law than are commissions. But courts should not use these truths as pretexts for laying
down rules which are nothing more than substitutions of their judgment
for that of the more expert commissions, and which rules are not made
necessary by community habits and attitudes, nor by the wider scheme
of the law as a body. To take what is perhaps the most important of
all examples in the utility field: if commissions had been left to themselves they might have worked out as a measure of the value of a utility's
property for rate purposes the amount prudently invested in it. The
United States Supreme Court laid down the rule that the cost of reproduction must be taken into account in arriving at value. 90 Whether
this rule was made necessary by the habits and attitude of mind of the
community is at least debatable, as witness the host of critics of the
rule, which critics perhaps represent the mind of the community.0 t
Certainly the rule was distinctly not necessary to fit the test of value for
rate purposes into the general pattern of the law, for it is recognized
that value for rate purposes is a peculiar thing, 98 different from value
for the other purposes of the law, such as value for tax purposes, condemnation purposes, and the like.9 9 Moreover, the Supreme Court laid
down' its rule in the name of due process, which prevents change. 100
Perhaps the rule of the Supreme Court is better than the rule the commissions might have worked out; great numbers of economists, lawyers,
and commissions think otherwise ;101 but the important point is that the
rule laid down by the court prevented the shaping of any other rule from
the long experience of expert bodies in this constantly developing field.
Rules shaped by commissions themselves have capacity for constant
growth and change produced by close contact with the problems out of
which the rules grew; rules laid down by courts, especially when done
in the name of due process, are rigid. It is to be remembered that com"' DICKImSON, op. cit. supra note 88, at 233.
Id. at 234.
Hanft, Control of Electric Rates in North Carolina (1934) 12 N. C.L. REV.
289, 302.
171bid. One of the critics is President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Id. at 303, n. 67.
"Id. at 301.
'Id. at 302.
uo Bluefield Waterworks & I.Co.v.Pub. Serv. Comm., 262 U. S.679, 43 Sup.
Ct.1675, 67 L. ed. 1176 (1923).
'Hanft, op. cit. supra note 96, at 302.
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missions not only specialize in utility cases, but have a constant contact
with utility problems through their regulatory powers, which contact
courts do not have.
Although it is necessary that the commissions be given freedom to
exercise their capacities as experts if they are to grow to their maximum
usefulness, it is also true that for the time being a court check on their
activities is desirable. Sometimes commissions make decisions for
which there can be no defense; the decisions are just downright wrong.
One reason for this lies in the fact that some commissions are expert
only in theory, and are in fact chosen for political reasons. So long as
such conditions are present it will be necessary to have a resort to courts
unless utilities are to be the victims of politicians on commissions to
make a name for themselves, or the victims of commissioners unskilled
in the highly complicated matters with which they must deal. When a
commission makes a decision which contains a downright error in
reasoning,10 2 or is contrary to the first elements of fair play,' 0 3 the
commission should be corrected.
In this article there have been discussed legal means of securing to
commissions freedom to use their own expert judgment and information. The means are at hand; what is lacking is a general desire to
' In West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. Us. Comm., 294 U. S. 63, 67, 55 Sup. Ct. 316,
319, 79 L. ed. 761, 767 (1935) the court pointed out that the commission had madd
mathematical errors in fixing rates. In City of Memphis v. So. Bell T. & T. Co.,

supra note 59, at.482 the commission required that income on amounts credited to
depreciation reserve be added to the depreciation reserve. But it is universally
conceded, indeed conceded in this very opinion, that the object of a depreciation
reserve is to keep the company's property intact. If the property is depreciated
20%, then the depreciation reserve should be 20%. If the income on that 20%
is denied to the company, it will be receiving an income on only 80% of its
property.
An amazing decision is to be found in Re Butte Water Co., 10 P. U. R. (n.s.)
26 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1935). Among the extraordinary propositions laid
down by the commission was the statement that since the depreciation reserve
equalled the present value of the company's properties, no present value would
have to be allowed. Decisions such as this should be corrected.
' In West Ohio Gas Co. v. P. Us. Comm., 294 U. S. 63, 55 Sup. Ct. 316, 79
L. ed. 761 (1935) the validity of rates for gas fixed by a state commission was in
question. The court, reversing the commission, pointed out that in fixing the
company's rates for the city of Lima the commission had applied the average distribution costs in all the utility's territory; but in fixing rates for the city of
Kenton on the same day, the commission used the distribution costs for Kenton
only. If the average distribution costs for the whole territory had been used in
the Kenton case it would have been to the company's advantage. On the showing
made by the court there is no doubt that the commission decision was indefensible.
The court was requiring merely elementary fair play when it is said that the
commission must use consistently whatever territorial unit it adopts. In Morris
Water Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 118 Pa. Super. Ct. 416, 180 Ati. 72 (1935) the
court held unreasonable an order of the commission requiring a small water company, with a capital stock of $10,000 and a mortgage debt of $12,000, to enlarge its
mains and extend them 32 miles at a cost of $50,000. See also State ex rel. Ore.Wash. Water Serv. Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 184 Wash. 451, 51 P. (2d) 610
(1935); Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Federal
Supreme Court (1921) 35 HAv. L. Rxv. 127, 151.
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make use of them. More important than any legal device for preventing
further hampering restrictions by courts, and for freeing commissions to
operate and develop as future needs require, is the attitude with which
the whole problem is approached. 10 4 Many courts would gain in modesty by reflecting upon the fact that it was their own deficiencies which
led the whole country in one sweeping emphatic movement to set up
specialized administrtaive tribunals to handle the complex problem of
administering justice in great specialized branches of human activity.
In correcting the abuses of commission regulation the courts should be
careful not to attempt to enter into its room, bringing with them their
own limitations in knowledge and technique which made necessary the
founding of the administrative tribunals in fhe first place. If courts,
and lawyers, become too sure that they themselves are the bulwarks of
justice in this field, they may prove to be the insurers of futility. They
may prevent from being done the task they can not do.
What is needed is a recognition that society has made a change in
the technique of administering justice; that the change was made necessary by the crowding problems of a civilization so complex as to demand
specialization; and that the new type of tribunals must be left free to
develop into something different from, and perhaps better than, anything yet perfected by civilization for the handling of its legal problems.
The product of that development may be a system of specialized courts,
with expanded powers refined by experience from the present powers of
administrative bodies.
' The court in Steenerson v. Gt. No. Ry., supra note 10, 72 N. W. at 716, said,
"The members of such a commission should be men of great financial ability, who
have had a large amount of training and experience to fit them for their responsible and difficult duties, and they should be thoroughly familiar with the many
financial and economic problems which enter into the business of constructing and
operating railroads. How is a judge, who is not supposed to have any of this
special learning or experience, and could not take judicial notice of it if he had it,
to review the decision of the commissioners, who should have it and should act
upon it? It seems to us that such a judge is not fit to act in such a matter....
Before a judge can act intelligently in such a matter, he must have an amount of
this special knowledge and experience which it will take him years to acquire."

